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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HI:t;RY THOMAS ADAMS and HENRY
THOMAS ADAMS, I I I,

Case No. 19342

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vsSTEPHEN L. GUBLER, TED
GUBLER, VENLA GUBLER,
STEAMBOAT VISTA, INC.,
THE LESLIE \IILCOX FAMILY
TRUST, LaPRELE G. ORTON,
GLEN L. GUBLER and JEAN G.
COX, Trustees of the
LESLIE IJlLCOX FAMILY TRUST,
Defendants and Respondents.)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Plaintiffs to
establish a 15% interest in the real property subject of
this lawsuit.

Plaintiffs base their allegations on written

contracts entered into with Stephen L. Gubler and Ted L.
Gubler individually and as agents of the Defendant Steamboat
Vista, Inc., and the Leslie \.Jilcox Family Trust.
l1p1wlL:rnts' action is for specific performance.
l"

Essential

the specific performance claim was reformation of certain

documents to delete supposed conditions relating to (1) the
sale of the subject property and (2) an interest in the

1

Defendant Steamboat Vista, Inc.

In support

(>1

argument of reformation and claim for specific

1hc•i
l'E'I

1·

Lc.i:.::"'

Appellants also sought to have the Leslie \lilcux Famil·,•
Trust declared invalid and declared merely the alLer

e~ 1 ,,.

the Defendant Ted L. Gubler.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Fifth Judicial
District Court, without a jury, on September 30,
and October 2, 1981.

Octcih~r

On June 30, 1983, the court entered

its judgment from which this Appeal is taken entering
judgment against the Plaintiffs on all issues raiseu, u.icf
that Defendants \·Jere ordered to return a $7 ,SOG <leposit to
the Plaintiffs.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPE.\L
Appellants seek reversal of the trial courL',
judgment entered against them on the grounds that tht
court's Findings of Fact are unsupported by the evidence
presented at trial and that on the basis of the evicle11cc r ..
Appellants are entitled to a 157, interest in the subject
real estate.

Appellants also ask that the ca:~e )," rer."'''

to the trial court for proceedings to pc:rtition tire
property.

2

...1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Henry Thomas Adams and his son, Henry Thomas Adams
JI!, hegan negotiations for the purchase of the subject real
~•late

17.

in the early Fall of 1979. See Findings of Fact No.

(Trial Transcript (hereafter TT) pages 27-29).

Steven

R. Carter, the real estate broker, advised Appellants and
Gublers of the availability of the subject property.

The

size of the real estate (approximately 831 acres) and the
amount of money involved in purchasing said real estate
(approximately $840,000) precluded any one of the
individuals of this action from purchasing the property
outright by themselves.

For that reason, the parties

negotiated to pool their assets for the purpose of
purchasing the property.

Additional, outside, investors

were also sought to participate in the investment.

Each of

the parties would, after purchase, have an undivided
interest in the real estate.
The negotiations continued through the Fall of

197Q and intu the early Winter months of 1980.

The Leslie

Wilcox Family Trust initially negotiated purchase of the
subiect property in its name on December 1, 1979.
l 111dillg of Fact No.

12 and Trial Exhibit No. 1.

See
The

i1p1wl l<rnts obtained a signed document from the manager of

tlie Leo>lie Hilcox Family Trust, on or about January 2, 1980,
l'l"<ll,:i

sing to convey to the Appellants an undivided 157.

interest in said property.

Trial Exhibit No. 2 (included in

th1· apjH:nclix) and Findings of Fact Nos. 19 and 20.

3

The parties plan continued l·Jith tht· cr,.;it i,,n ,,:
corporation, Steamboat Vista,

Inc.

purpose of purchasing the real
Family Trust.

It was form"J fc,r rh,·

e~;tate

from the Leslie \iilc

A contract was executed for the sale of the

property from the trust to the corporation on or about
December 5, 1979.
No. 4 0.

Trial Exhibit No. 11 and Findin;:; of face

The con tract was signed by Stephen Cub ler and Toe,

Adams in behalf of the corporation, although the corporJtior
was not formally incorporated at that ti1:1e.

Shares of stcci

in the corporation were to be sold to the Leslie \lilcuc:
Family Trust, to the Adams and to other investors.

Tom

Adams, Steven Carter and Stephen Gubler were instn.11;1ental
setting up the corporate entity.

1·

Stepheu Cub! er in behal;

of the corporation executed stock purchase agrL·ernents in
favor of Tom Adams and his son.

Trial Exhibits r:os. S anc'

(included in the appendix), Findings of Fact Nos. 32 and

11

The stock Purchase Agreements contained a condicion that
they were subject to the Board of Directors dpproval.

Thi,

condition was of no concern to Mr. Adams, as he and tir.
Steve Carter 11ere to be on the Board of Directors.

Stephu'

Gubler also received $7,500.00 from the Adams, as a
downpayment for said stock, or in the alternative, f••
portion of the downpayoenc for the property itscli uc"''
agreement with the trust.

TT, Page 30, and F incl int; of Fae:

No. 33.

4

Another investor, Everett Johnston, was found who
nad sufficient capital to fund the remaining interest in the
property.

The Leslie Wilcox Family Trust sold a 50%

interest to Everett Johnston.

Finding of Fact No. 47.

The

Leslie Wilcox Family Trust then refused to sell any interest
in the property to the Appellants.

Trial Exhibit No. 8. The

trust refused to perform its contract with Steamboat Vista,
1nc., for the purchase of the property.

Steamboat Vista,

Inc., through its then Board of Directors (Ted Gubler,
Stephen Gubler and Venla Gubler) refused to honor its
cornmicment to the Appellants by transferring stock in said
corpor<ltion to the Appellants.

Trial Exhibit No. 7.

The

corporation also refused to enforce its contract to purchase
the property from the trust.
The Leslie Wilcox Family Trust was created by the
Defendant Ted L. Gubler and his wife for the supposed
benefit of their children.

Findings of Fact Nos. 1 and 2.

Ted L. Gubler transferred nearly all of his assets into said
trust at the time of its creation.

Findings of Fact No. 7.

Teel L. Gubler remains the manager of said trust and handles
ell of the day to day activities of the property of said

lru,r.

The original trustees were Jean Gubler Cox, Glen

l .. 111IJ Gubler and Steven R.

Carter.

Finding. of Fact No. 3.

The trustees during the period of October, 1979, through
tLiy, 1980, were Jean Gubler Cox, Glen Laub Gubler and
L~Prcle

G. Orton.

5

Steamboat Vista, Inc., was proposed an<! toir,,,
by the Defendant Stephen L. Gubler, the Appel l'lnt Tu 1,,
and the Appellants' broker Steven Carter.

The corpora ti ,1

was formed to purchase the subject real property.

200-201.

,, ,dl<.
1

T'f

The corporation however was subsequently org 2 Di 7 c;

with the Defendants Ted L. Gubler, Stephen L. Gubler and hl,
wife Venla Gubler as directors and officers.

Findiug

r,f

Fact No. 28, Trial Exhibit No. 12.
At all times pertinent to the transactions
involved in the instant lawsuit, the trustees of the Leslie
Wilcox Family Trust were the brother and two sistets of the
trustor and Defendant Ted L. Gubler.

Stephen L. Gubler

a~sc

acted as an agent for the Leslie \Jilcox Fc1mily Trust durir, 6
this period of time.
Gubler,

Stephen L. Gubler is the son of

Teo~,

the trustor.
On March 10, 1980, the Adaris tendered additiu111l

monies in the sum of $30, 300. 00 to Southern Utah Title
Company to be held in escrow until the purchase of the
subject property was closed.
37 and 73.

Trial Exhibit No. lS; TT PJt:co

This amount represented the remainiug ha lance

due for their 15% share of the downpayment on the

6

prup~r<

ARG\J1'EUT
l:'OlNT I:

FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT ARE
WITHOUT EVIDENTIARY FOUUDATION

The factual findings on which the Court's ruling
was based are unsupported in the evidence.
1.;hi

The findings

ch act most affirmatively to defeat Plaintiffs• claim are

those relating to the validity of the trust, and the
trustees' acts, and the validity of the corporation.

To

facilitate reference to the Findings of Fact, they are
reproduced in the Appendix.
The true facts of this case support the
application of legal doctrines which compel a result in
Appellants favor:

the facts regarding the nature of the

trust support application of alter ego and fraudulent
conveyance law to the trust, and defeat the "condition" of
trustees' approval in Adams agreement with the trust for a
15~

interest in the land.
The true nature of the corporation compels the

granting of specific enforcement of the stock subscription
attd land purchase agreements.
Additionally, Plaintiffs are entitled to
11·1~usicion in their favor of a constructive trust on a 15%

interest in the property.

7

Findings on Validity of

Tru~t

Several of the factual findings ot Lhc rrirll
dealt with the alleged Leslie Wilcox Family Trust.
of those factual findings,

1o

~

the Appellants take tssue,

particularly in regards to Findings of Fact Nos. S, 6,
11, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 25.

These findings

claim that the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust \1as a valid and
existing trust from the time of its creation throughout the
applicable period of time in question.

They also indicace

the trustees were in direct and exclusive control of the
trust and its assei::s and that the truster's (Ted Cubler'sl
activities as general manager and the

truster~'

son's

activities as agent of the trust were of no consequence
to the validity of the subject trust.

dS

The findings also

indicate that the trustees were fully aware of all trust
transactions and that they kept currently advised as to z, 1
trust matters through the numerous meetings they helc1 •
These findings are totally unsubstantiated and
grossly in error.

The trustor and Defendant, Ted L. Gub!e•

had actual and direct control of all property Lbxl he
originally conveyed to the trust.

Any de a 1 i ngs Toe ;,J,1 . ' '

had \vith Ted Gubler should be construed as if hl' ,·c1 •
dealing with Ted Gubler in his personal capacity,
own personal property.

8

1•t

ti• 1'·

The stdternents of each of the former trustees who
tc:;tified during this trial indicate that they did exactly
and only what Ted Gubler told them to do.

Testimony of Jean Cox, Supposed Trustee
In her testimony, Jean Cox indicated that Ted
Cubler did most of the leg work in regard to the trust
assets and made most of the business arrangements and that
she would merely pass judgment on whether she agreed with
his decisions or not.

(TT, Page 154).

Specifically with

regard to the real property in this lawsuit, Mrs. Cox
indicated she oerely approved the purchase of the property
in the name of the trust.

She did not observe the property

betore she signed the contract.
property at any time.

She did not observe the

She stated that Ted or Stephen Gubler

had recomu:e:1ded the property to her and that she thereafter
signed the contract.

(See TT, Pages 155, 156 and 157).

Mrs. Cox subsequently stated that all negotiations, through
the entire transactions in question, were conducted through
Ted or Stephen Gubler and that the contracts she signed
',,ur in,; this period of

d

time were all upon the recommendation

eith1Cr Stephen or Ted Gubler.

(TT, Page 161).

Mrs. Cox was asked, "Have you ever gone against
t

Ii"' .rdvice or wishes of Ted Gubler, as a trustee."

Mrs. Cox

cL:ited "1 don't think so," (TT, Page 165, Lines 20-22).
t!rs. Cox lacked knowledge of the trust and its workings.
9

She stated, "But I didn't understand the trust
mean, the proceedings part of it."
and 5).

t

hc1t

1

<i

1

(TT, Pcigc l6J, 1 uic;

She did not know if the trust had

J

balll:

where a bank account was located if one existed.

She die

not think that a bank account had anything in it.

She al;,

did not know who paid the e}:penses of the trust (TT, Page

163).
It is also important to note that t!rs. Cox
felt that the property was Ted Gubler's.

stil~

In discussing wh;·

Ted Gubler's relationship to the trust was she stated,
"Well, actually he managed - - it was his property,
actually, most of it was.
.
"
h lS.

The original propertiPs wete

(TT, Page 161, Lines 19 and 20).

With respect

Lo(,

home that allegedly belongs to the trust, but in which Ted
Gubler resides she stated that Ted Gubler ha<l lived in
house "as long as he had had it".

t~Jc

(TT, Page 163, Line 21)

The testimony of the trial shoHed that Stephen Gubler
as agent for the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust.

Mrs.

actc~

Cu~

stated in response to the question whether Stephen Gubler
was an agent of the trust, "I don't think so."

163, Line 1).

10

(TT,

~a;;e

Testimony

o~

O:her "Trustees"

Cler. Gubler, a fori7ler trustee of the Leslie Wilcox
Far.ii 1 y Trust,

2pparently took a so:::ewhat more active role in

the trust affairs, in that he actually walked over the
particular property in question.

Eowever, his testimony

indicates that his position as trustee was merely as a
figurehead and that he only did what Ted and Stephen Gubler
wanted him to do.

It was Ted or Stephen Gubler who

presented each of the contracts during the applicable period
of time to Glen for his signature.

(TT, Page 173).

According to Glen Gubler, Ted Gub:er was manager of the
trust and initiated the buying and selling of trust
property.

\lhen asked if he served Elainly to ratify Ted

Gubler's decision he stated, "\·iell, that and - - yeah, to
ratify them, or if I so desire, not:."

He subseqently stated

that he had never disagreed with Ted Gubler in what Ted
Gubler wanted to do with the trust property.
Lim·s 15-22).

(TT, Page 175,

\:hen asked if Ted G;.i'ciler paid rent to the

trust for the use of the residence, he responded, "That
would hc: a little ridiculous wo·.il::ri't it?" and then, "No, he
clo,·"1'r."

(TT, Page 178, Lines 13-16.)

Mrs. LaPrele Orton,

fotiner trustee, was asked concerning Ted's duties as a
1:1.indgcr and she stated, "Hell, oanage his businesses".
\!"/'c'

l

'1

J,

Line 18).

11

(TT,

Both LaPrele Orton and Glen Gubler s1 ,itecd 1 ,,
had been Ted Gubler who asked them to be t rus lee,, at

p

initiation of the trust and they honored his request.

1

,

,
1

',r_"

also indicated that it had been Ted Gubler whu asLed rhei:
step down from being trustees and once again, as they hes
throughout the time they had been trustees, they did e:,act.
what Ted Gubler told them to do,
being trustees.

and they stepped d01m fr,y,

(TT, Page 171 and 190).

Steve Carter, another former trustee, was the 0 ,,~
trustee to testify who was a not a direct relative of the
Gubler family.

In regards to what he did .:is a trustee

2

portion of his testimony is recorded as follows:

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

What were your duties as a trustee?
I had none.
I mean, J was never cn11C1cted
Was there ever a meeting held?

No.

Did you sign any docu~ents?
I signed a document that Ted brought by ~
office.
How many times did you do that?
Orice.
Did you know the other trustees at that i
Yes.
I knew two of them.
I kne\'i Jean C,"·'
and I also knew Glen Gubler.
Did you meet with Hrs. Cox or tlr. Gubler
during that early period of tinw, six r1[)nth,
or one year period of time?
r~o.

11

(TT, Page 118, Lines 5-18).

Mr. Carter was then asked concerning the originul
organization meeting of the trust and the purp0rrcd
of that first meeting.

Q.

'1 "''

His testimony is as follows:

Okay. Are you saying that it was nut tielu,
that meeting was not held.

12

I

A.

No.
He just d=opped this by and I signed it.
I show you wtat - - well - A.
I signed it but I wasn't present.
I was
doing it to facilitate Hr. Gubler."
(TT, Page 135, Lines 11-16).

Q.

Conduct o: Trust Business
During the period of time in question the other
trustees did not rreet frequeritly or formally to discuss any
type of trust business.

Glen Gubler indicated that during

the period of time (negotiations surrounding the purchase of
the subject real property) he thought they only met formally
about three times.

(TT, Page 174).

However, there is no

that minutes were kept of any formal meetings

ev1d~nce

during this period of time or during any of the prior years
of the trusts existenc<:.

Jean Cox was asked, "How often did

you hold meetings as Truste.es?", she responded, "We didn't
hold a lot of their.. "

(TT, Page 165, Lines 6-7).

Reportedly

a trustees meeting was held on March 12, 1980, and supposed
were kept at such meecing.

~inutes

An alleged copy of those

minutes were sent to Tom Ada2s indicating that the trust had
voted nut to sell him an interest in the subject property.
Howev~r.

th:H

~uch

the trustees, Jean Cox and Glen Gubler, testified
meeting \.:as never held and that Stephen Gubler had

c,ir<1ply drawn up those minutes and had brought them to each
cd
t

l)

the trustees for their signature prior to it being sent
l'ur~1

Adams.

(See TT, Page 163, 164, and 184).

13

Perhaps Mr. Glen Gubler stated it best itt
discussing their activities as trustees and the " l!IE'C t-

J. 1,,

that they held when he stated,
1 think that most people as a family don't ~'eu
too often as a fc;irmal meeting like that and
down a gavel on it.
We meet as brothers a~d
~
sisters and discuss things as they pertain to ic
and we come to a conclusion.
This is our
meeting."
(TT, Page 183, Lines 3-7).

b·in,

The only real meeting established in the testimcn.
was held on or about May 10, 1980, to reaffirm the allev,ed
minutes of their March 12, 19 8 0, meeting.

Th is \<Jas of

course, after this lawsuit had been initiated and after
depositions of those parties had been taken.

In regarrl;

l'·

the Hay 10th meeting, Stephen Gubler' s testimon; stales,
"May 10th is when we finally had a - - May l 0th we had a
formal meeting where this was reaffirmed."
(TT, Page 212, Lines 6-8).

Stephen Gubler herein is

treating the trust and its property as though it wE're hio,
just as his father has done throughout the duration of thi'
trust.
Dealings with "Trust" Property
Ted Cubler stated that his duties in rer;ards tc•
the assets of the trust didn't differ any from the tir.1e ,,h ..
they were all held in his own name, before the cre.1•
the trust, from the time after the trust was c rea t cc

Lei• '
1
,

than he stated he had to go to the trustees to have thew

.1ppr"ve or disa?prove his actions.

""''<!

(TT, Page 244).

As has

shmm the trustees never did disapprove any of Ted

1.c.bler' s actio:-is.

Mr. Ted Gubler also stated that he

handled the day to day business of the trust and the day to
day management decisions of the trust.

(See TT, Page 245).

l!r. Ted Gubler was fin ally asked, "And they (the trustees)
always ratifiec'. and fairly well rubber stamped your
recommendation."

He answered,

Hell, I wouldn't call them rubber stamped. They
basically have agreed with what I wanted to do
because they felt I was trying to do the very best
I could for the beneficiaries.
Call it what you
will."
(TT, Page 252, Lines 10-15).
The record is clear that Tom Adams dealt solely
and exclusively with Ted and Stephen Gubler in working out a
viable way to purchase the subject real property.

Mr. Adams

negotiations were always with Hr. Ted Gubler or Stephen
Gubler or Steven Carter.

He never met with the trustees of

the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust.

(See TT, Page 44).

Mr.

Adams was merely interested in obtaining what he had
bargained and regotiated for from the very beginning, that
uc:s

d

15% interest in the subject r-eal property.

That

property had been promised to him by all of the individual
p~rLL~s

involved.

However, Mr. Ted Gubler and Mr. Stephen

l.u\Jlcr attefilpted to negate those proraises by standing behind
the e11Lities they had created, namely the Leslie Hilcox
fan1ily Trust ar:d Steamboat Vista, Inc. to protect themselves
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from liability and to e}:clude Tom Adams from

t lie

transaction in which he had been so intir;1atcly

µrc, 1,,_ 1 1 ,1

irivo[·,c~

Mr. Steven Carter stated:
"Well, because basically Steamboat Vista, Leslie
Wilcox Family Trust and, you know the whole - _ .,
were dealing basically with the same people ~nd
you know it was the intent that the money that '
was, you know disbursed, you knm-1, was for the
same purpose.
Steamboat Vista and Leslie Wilco;,
Family Trust and Stephen Gubler and Ted Gubler
were all the same parties."
(TT, Page 115, Lines 7-13).
Mr. Adams'

impression of \vho he uas dealing witr,

is best summed up by the following soliloquy;
The answer necessarily has to be the lenr,th ot t>
question.
And the answer is, that it was
difficult to know where they were Janci[lg,
Sometimes we were dancing with Ted Gubler as Tee
Gubler; sometimes we were dancing with Ted Guble'.
as Si::eamboat Vista, through his son, Stephen
Gubler; sometimes we were dancing with Ted Gublet
as trustor - manager of the truc;t.
So exhibit 2
shows that I was endeavoring to demonstrate that
whoever Ted Gubler is, I am buying land ancl
dancing with him."
(See TT, Page 82, Line 20
through Page 83 Line 3).
Findings on Validity of Corporation
Several of the other findings of Fact found b;- '''
court, while unsubstantiated in the evidence, dealt with '"'
corporation known as Steamboat Vista,

Inc.

The AppcllaM'

objected specifically to Findings of Fact Nos. 26, ~I.

31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, and 43.

Tlwc.c

dealt mainly with the facts surrounding the organL

lt11c"
di Lnr

Steamboat Vista, Inc., who organized it, who set it up,
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'i.',

1·1hich parties were principal=

in it and with the issuance of

sruck and the receipt of rnon2y for that stock in said
corporation.
Objection was made =o these Findings because they
do not have evidentiary suppc;:-t.
role played by the

in this complex transaction,

corporatic~

nor do they reflect the

They do not reflect the

deal~~gs

the individual parties had

one with another, nor the pu::Jose for which the corporation
was set up.
The organization o: Steamboat Vista, Inc. was
proposed at an early stage,

the parties' dealings to

i~

purchase the subject propert::, for the purpose of providing
a vehicle whereby the real eo:c.te could be purchased.
the

corporatic~

Yet

was additione.lly proposed to allow

flexibility in selling off i::-cerests in the property by
selling shares of stock in a corporation instead of selling
J

direct real estate interes=.

According to Steve Carter,

the corporation was proposed isitially for tax reasons.
(TT, Page 111).
Tol'l ,\dams, Steven ·: e.rter and Stephen Gubler were
instrumental in bringing this corporation into existence.
lb~y

were to be the original ~irectors and officers of the

corporation according to the
C1aer.

(TT, Pages 67, 110

=esti~ony

127).

=-~:c'.

of Mr. Adams and Mr.
Though the Articles

ot Incorporation were not si;::-.ed until February of 1980, it

j_

7

is readily apparent that the above-mentionc-d lnrlivill 11 :1 1.
previously acted as if the corporation were al rt.:ddy
existence.

iii

Mr. Carter stated that they had had severdl

meetings during the period of time prior to rite corporaLc
filing and that they had acted as a corporation and in the
capacity of a corporation, although all of the legal
formalities had not been completed.

(TT, Page 111 and 128;

Throughout these pre-incorporation meetings, the
parties worked together and discussed how the corporation
was going to operate, who would operate it, etc.

It

WdS

during this period of time that the stock subscription
agreements were signed by Stephen Gubler.
Nos. 5 and 6.

Trial Exhibits

Under these subscriptions (which iippear in

the appendix) Mr. Adams paid $7,500 as an initial depu•it
for that stock or in the alternative for purchase of the
(See TT, Page 30).

subject real property.

Mr. Adams

indicated that he knew that the stock subscription
agreements had some conditional language in them, namely
that they were subject to the Board of Directors approval.
However, he stated, "

.

. that did not concern me lic·c.1us1:

I trusted these people and because I was to be a dirrcror
and an officer and we 17ere moving a big project fc1n.1M 1:
(TT, Page 67, Lines 10-12).

Mr. Adams further e;C.1t~cl"

regards to the conditional language pursuant to the

q11 1 '-'

1

if he knew that it was conditional, "If I had felt that in
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ct!IY way, 1 would not have signed it and turned loose of my
1r:onl'y, because I trusted these people.
by my broker as honorable people."

(TT, Page 68, Lines

14-16).

The condition in the stock purchase agreements
stated, "This sale is subject: to board of direct:ors approval
for sale of stock", Trial Exhibit Nos. 5 and 6.

Tom Adams,

Stephen Gubler and Steven Carter were to be on the initial
board of directors.

(TT, Pages 61, 67 and 127)

As an

initial director, Tom Adaras knew how he would vote in
regards to the stock purchase agreements.

Since Stephen

Gubler signed those documents, he relied on his signature as
an indication of how he would vote.

Steven Carter never

testified how he would vote, but his statements throughout
his testimony seem to indicate that he would have voted to
uphold the stock purchase agreements.

He stated that the

trust and the corporation and the Gublers were all the same
parties and that all of the parties were working toward the
joint purchase and ownership of the subject property.
Page 115)

(TT,

Mr. Adams and Mr. Carter never actually became

directors and Stephen Gubler voted against honoring the
olock purchase agreements, which action is contrary to the
original intent of the parties when the agreements were
sir;ned.

i

I

L

They were presented
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The record shows that the Articles o!
Incorporation uere filed on February 25, 19l\O, but tli'"c ti.
Adams and Mr. Carter were not listed as beini; on the EoJlc
of Directors.

Stephen Gubler, his father Ted Gubler,

dr1G

Stephen Gubler's wife, Venla Gubler, were listed as the
original Board of Directors.

(Trial Exhibit No. 12)

Afte•

the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust had consurmnated a sale wich
an outside investor, namely Everett Johnston,

that Board

0;

Directors took action against the Adams and unanimously
agreed that they would not honor the stock subscription
agreements.

(Trial Exhibit No. 7)

Mr. Everett Johnston hri

come up with all the outside capital the Gublers needed
invest in the subject real property.
a 50% interest in the land.

tu

Mr. Johns ton receiveri

Ted and Stephen Gubler no

longer needed the Adams further participation, althouth
$7 ,500.00 of the Adams money had already been used hy the
Gublers in the downpayment, therefore they failed and
refused to honor any of their commitments to them invoking
the conditional language of the stock purchase agreement
the agreement to sell a lSZ interest in the
directly from the trust.

~(

prope~ty

The Gublers stated that Fverr,rt

Johnston was unwilling to go through the corpor:itu•1• 1,itl·
his investment.

However, the record is void of dny '"'

evidence that such was the case.

Even if it was the

L«-"·

it should not prohibit the Adams from having their ])%
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i'

interest in the property.
Lhe

T~e

negotiations of Tom Adams and

Gublers, frorr. the very begi:rning assumed that due to the

size of the project

sufficie~:

capital from outside

investors was required to ma'.ze the project move forward.
Gub1ers received the needed ca?ital from Mr. Johnston,
however, instead of Adams, arcd at that point the Gublers
systematically took steps to exclude the Adams from any
further participation with

t~e

property.

Appellants Money Csed in the Purchase
Pursuant to the nego-:iations that Mr. Adams had
involved himself in, he initially deposited $7,500 pursuant
to the stock option agreemenc:s in Steamboat Vista, Inc.

He

subsequentally put up an additional $30,300 for purchase of
stock in Steamboat Vista, Inc., or his interest in the
subject property.

(See TT, Page 3 7) .

His intent all along

was that he would enjoy ownership of a 15% interest in the
subject propert:-'.

Hr. Adams s::ated that the documents

signed with the Leslie Wilcox ?amily Trust and with
Steamboat Vista, Inc., were :o:: the purpose of making doubly
sure that there would be no s:..ipup and that he, " . . . was
en tit. Led to buy this land".

wanted to be certain that I

:'.r. Adams further stated, "I
~o~ld

have the participation

µror1ised and urged upon me ir. the Graff Farm, because I
thout;ht it was a reasonable ':J·-.:siness proposition."

'.'.l

(See TT,

Page 40, Lines 12, and 23-25).

Mr. Ad;rni,; L1te1- l•cl,·r,

1

,

his payment of $30 ,300 to Southern Utah Title· c;,,lll\lrlli)
payment for, "Purchase of 15% of E.J. Grdff Farm nc;ir
Hurricane, Utah."

(See TT, Page 73, Lines

23-2~).

Mr

Carter's testimony in regards to the $7, 500 indicate:; th,.r
it was, "For the purchase of 15% interest in the total Gra:'
Farm."

(See TT, Page 112, Lines 9 and 10).
The $7 ,500.00 that had been placed in Mr. Carter'

trust account was later released to Stephen L. Gubler for
the purpose of helping the Gublers pay the dovnf•ayment on
the subject property and in Mr. Carter's words, "For is;
ownership in the Graff Farm."

(See TT, Page 113, Line J).

Mr. Carter later stated that he thought the funds 1·1cn, uoc:
as part of the earnest money that was put up by the Gublec,
and the trust.

(See TT, Page 114).

Mr. Carter's posit10

1
-

was later reiterated during the course of the trial when
asked upon cross-examination Hhether he had refunded

f'lolle"

out of his trust account to Hr. Adams he stated, "Oh, l
didn't have tlr. Adams money, it had already been tendered."
(TT, Page 141, Lines 17-18).
The testimony of Mr. Carter further clarifies trc
fact that the Adams and the Gublers had planned on the
participation from the very beginnins of their ncgut1cil 1u 11
and the fact that each of the parties relied upon e.J•:l,
others pronises, statements and the capital that h'1<l h•'
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i>I

"•1iJeJ hy the Adams when Mr. Carter stated, "Because the

r~asun

,,f

why they made the original earnest money was because

Tom Adams having an abundance of cash and they were

assured they would be able to consummate the transaction."
(TT, Page 144, Lines 10-13).
\,J1 lcox

It is noted that the Leslie

Family Trust was che original party who posted the

,·arnest money.
lir. Carter, as the broker in this particular
transaction, was instrumental in putting this entire large
transaction together.

In that regard, the Leslie Wilcox

Family Trust had become an investor, the Adams had become
investors and subsequentally Everett Johnston became an
investor.

Mr. Carter stated that he informed Mr. Everett

Johnston of the investment possibility in the real property.
(TT, rage 120).

The Gublers and Adams needed additional

capital from outside investors in order to purchase the
property.
There is no doubt but that the $7,500 invested by
i'iL.

Tom Adams v;ent towards the purchase of the subject

property.

Mr.

Stephen Gubler and Mr. Ted Gubler both stated

that the money was applied towards the downpayment and the

rurchase of the Graff Farm.

(See TT, Pages 208 and 252).

Th'-' trustee Glen Gubler stated that he initially thought

th.it chc $7,500.00 had gone towards purchase of the subject
prupc·rty, but that he had found out since that time that
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those funds had not been used for the subject proµertv
stated that the funds had been used in an entirely

scp<1c

purchase and that he had been given that informati 011
Stephen Gubler.

(TT, Page 180).

liy

The later statements ol

Mr. Stephen Gubler indicating that the money had gone
towards the purchase of the Graff farm indicate his doub!P
dealing with the Adams and his attempt to convince the
trustees that the Adams were legally not entitled to receive
a portion of the subject property.
The Appellants conclusion objected to a major
portion of the court's Findings of Fact for good reason
those Findings of Fact were unsupported by the evidence
presented during trial.

The Appellants citatic>ris to the

trial transcript accurately and adequately show the
overwhelming weight of evidence.

Such errurs are f~tal

tr'

the lower court's Conclusions of Law and ultimate judgment.
The facts, as they were truly presented, are totally
contrary to the Conclusions drawn and judgment rendered
POINT II. THE LESLIE WILCOX FA!llLY TRUST IS
INVALID

A.

The Leslie Hilcoz Family Trust is Lhe alcer
ego of Ted Gubler.

The evidence on the trust shO\vS it is ''"] .·
alter ego of Defendant Ted Gubler.
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1

1,,.

The theory of the 2lter ego doctrine and of
pi~rcing
1

iL

the corporate veil has long been a part of the law

cur pu.ratior1s.

In discussin6 this concept, the

commentators and courts have usually placed themselves in
the context of corporate law.

However, the alter ego

doctrine is also applicable to other areas of the law where
one person has apparently pu: himself beyond the reach of
his creditors while at the

sa~e

time retaining the benefits

and enjoyment of the propertv he has purportedly conveyed
out of his personal name.
An early Utah Suprece Court case, in addressing
rhe alter ego doctrine, stateC.: "It would be a mere travesty
of justice if courts could or should refuse to look behind
Lhe men: form of a transaction in order to ascertain the
real truth, and reach and hole responsible the real parties
in interest."

\'estern Securities Company v. Spiro, 62 Utah

G23, 221 P. 856 (1923).

This case also cited the case of

liunrer v. Baker Moc:or Vehicle Co., (D.C.) 225 Fed. 1006
which held that the separate

e~tity

of a corporation may be

,hsregarded where it "is so or;anized and controlled, and
iLs

a[(airs are so conducted; as to make it merely an

instru~1entality

;ir 85Y.
,1r1<c

or adjunct cf 2nother corporation."

Ibid.

The Utah Court agreec ·..;ich a Washington Court's

ly'.>is in Spokane Merchants' Association v. Clere Clothing

Cl!111'~·

84 \lash. 616, 147 P. 414; where it stated that
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"Courts no longer hesitate to look through form' Lo
substance, and ignore a mere colorable corporaLe etHlty "'
the end that rights of third parties &hall be

proL~~LL~

The Utah case of Geary v. Cain, 79 Utah 268, 9 P.2d 3Yo
(1932) also held that courts will ignore form and look

t(,

substance in holding shareholders as the real parties in
interest: to prevent fraud,

to redress wrong, to do justiee.

Thus the rule is that the corporate entity may be entirel;·
disregarded in order to reach and protect the real pztrties
in interest and to disclose the real transaction.

The s 0 rr,e

theory and analysis should apply to trusts.
There are basically two requirements thdt need cc
be met before the alter ego doctrine applies.

The first

element requires such unity of interest and ovrnership thar
the separate personalities of the corporation and the
individual no longer exist.

The second element is, that ii

the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, ir
would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequic~~
result would follow.

Automotriz Del Golfo de Califocnia

v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1 (California, 1957);

S.A. De C.

Norman v. Murray First Thrift and Loan Company, 596 P.2d
1028 (1979).
Several cases outline actions which woul \I 111'· 1 t:
a court in holding that the corporation is the allct

c;'

one or a number of shareholders: Amoss v. Bennion, 18 Utcdi
2d 251, 420 P.2d 47 (1966); Grover v. Garn, 23 Uuih 2cl 44i,
26

1,611

P. 2d 598 ( 1970); State v. Voremus, 29 Utah 2d 373, 510

P.2d 526 (1973); Foster v. Blake Heights Corporation, 530
F./J DlS

(Ucah 1974).
In the Amoss case the defendant had signed a

contract dealing with the sale of land and livestock.

He

had signed personally and as president of a corporation.
\-/hen he questioned his authority to bind the corporation
which technically held title to the property, the court
said: "

. the record pretty clearly reflects that the

corporation was his alter ego, he having full control with
no one in a position to object to his transactions, nor to
offend him.

We think and hold that the record indicates a

one man operation and a ratification of his actions.
Consequently the corporation defendant would have to respond
as would he, to his commitments and of necessity equal
obeisance to the trial court's judgment."

The Grover case

agreed <·1ith 19 C.J.S. Corporations, §1004, p.471, "***but
Lhe trend of authority is to uphold as binding on the
corporation acts for contracts on its behalf by a person or
persons owning all or practically all the stock."

The

Crover court further stated that, "Some incorporators so
r~rfectly

fashion the structure and performance of a

c oq1orate entity to that of their individual personality

thac it is honestly said the corporate entity is the alter
ego of the natural person who designed it."
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Hhen the allegations and evidence slw··.1 thJt. ,
alter ego doctrine should apply, courts will (>hs,·r11,, tt:c
conduct of persons who control and rrwnipuLllc: cl"' c . ,,~,, 1
business.

,

The State v. Voremus court said thdt the alter

ego doctrine in commonly applied to "one man corporatioils"
that is, where one man owns practically all of the stork,
either directly or through others who hold it for his use
and benefit, and where the stockholder uses the corporatinc

1

as a shield to protect him from debts or wrongcloing,

lt

r,,,.;

also apply where the shareholder is so closely allied with
the corporation through ownership and r;ianagement as to
enable the court to see clearly that the corporate entity i·
but a sham and it is the stockholder who is doing business
behind the corporate shield.
The Foster and Grover cases also discussed an
estoppel theory and how shareholders, by their acts and
statements or where the corporation has invested its office·
or agent with actual or ostensible authority with kn<r.;leoge
that the third party will or does in fact rely thereoll, 1:i
be bound by such representations.
as quoted in Grover, at 477;

Black's Law Dicti.nnan

states "An estoppel by the

conduct of admissions of a party

-,': it is, and

;1

was, a familiar principle in the law of contr:1ct.s.

l\- 1d«'
]t

I

at the foundation of morals and is a cardinal point
exposition of promises, that one shall be bound by the
of facts which he had induced another to act upon."
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sLD'•
I

The facts in this case show that the Leslie Wilcox
lar.1ily Trust is Ted Gubler's alter ego.
c~~rcL~es

Ted Gubler

such pussessiun and control over the trust

properties that they are indistinguishable from any assets
or obligations he may hold personally.

The trust was

created July 15, 1973, TT, Page 241, Line 20.

At the

creation of the trust Ted Gubler transferred all his
property, both real and personal, to the trust.

Yet almost

seven years later Mr. Gubler still refers to the trust
property as "my home" 2nd "all the property that I've always
had",

(Deposition of Ted Gubler , at Page 6.)

The trustees

of the Les lie \.Ji lco}: Family Trust are merely a rubber stamp
for the decisions made by Ted Gubler.

In his deposition,

\1hen :isked about the purchase of the Graff Farm, Mr. Gubler
replied, ".

so we met with our trustees and told them

what we would like them to do."
Page 8.

Ted Gubler Deposition, at

Jean Cox was asked if she had ever acted

independently of the decisions of Ted or Stephen Gubler, she
stated, "I don't recall.

I may have.

Cox Deposition, at Page 18.

I don't know."

Jean

Glen Gubler was asked ".

you arc called upon, then, mainly to sign documents
r·.1l i

'.-'l
0

fying the decisions of the manager, is that correct?",

th the answer, "Right."

~;

~c:ec

Glen Gubler Deposition, at Page

also TT, Pages 165 and l 75.

Glen Gubler also stated

that Ted Gubler makes all the day to day management type of
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decisions with regard to the trust property,

.:md

tlic1L 1"

never disagreed with Ted Gubler' s decisions in reg;i 11 t"
1

trust property.

TT, Page 17). Tile statements In<lue ai'l"•c

the depositions of the respective Defendants are sioila,
content to the facts as stated in Point I of this Argument
as they were brought out during the trial of this matter.

B.

The creation of the Leslie Wilcox Family
Trust was a fraudulent conveyance by the
trustor, Ted L. Gubler.

The general rule as stated in 37 CJS Fraudulent
Conveyances is that both at common law and under statute

J

person cannot settle his estate in trust for his own
benefit, so as to be free from his liability for his debts.
The intention of the parties to such a transfer, whether
honest or fraudulent, is wholly immaterial.

The rule is

based on the self-evident proposition that a man's propert\
should be subject to the payment of his debts, although he
has vested a nominal title thereto in some other person.

le

is not necessary that the instrument specifically state the
the property is in trust for the use of the gr an tor, but,

1'

such is the legal effect as gathered from its language, tk
court will, as a matter of law, declare it void.

1'he

important fact is that the property is actually

'"'"·.c:., 11

trust for the use of the person transferring the pru1•cr 11
whether or not the trust declaration is open or secret, and
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........

•1h,.ther or not it is expressed in the conveyance or is the
,uhject of a private understanding.

Even though the

trustees have unlimited discretion, it will not take the
case out of the general rule.
Utah law is in accord with this general rule.
Utah Code Ann.

§25-1-11 (1953, as amended) states:

All deeds, gifts, conveyances, transfers or
assignments, verbal or written, of goods,
chattels, or things in action made in trust for
the use of the person making the same shall be
void as against the existing or subsequent
creditors of such person.
The section relates to transfers of personal property, but
the Utah SupreCTe Court, in Leach v. Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241
(Utah 1975) held that this "statute is but a codification of
the common law, which for reasons discussed herein, refused
to give recognition to trusts of this character involving
any kind of property."

Leach at 1244.

According to 37 CJS

Fraudulent Conveyances §62 the term "creditor" has been
construed very liberally, so as to include all persons who
have accounts,

claims, demands, interests, or causes of

action for which they are entitled to recover any debt,
<l~P1,1c1i,

penalty or forfeiture, and who may be hindered,

d1 layed, or defrauded by such conveyances.
J"

in accord with the general rule.

Again Utah law

Utah Code Ann. §25-1-1

rJ'l'l3, as amended) states that a creditor is, "a person
li,n·i"g <my claira, whether matured or unCTatured, liquidated

c•r unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent."
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The intent and effect of §25-1-11 is st.itd

J"

Leach to be, "to prevent a person from usin1: o crusL
device by which he can retain for hir:1self and enjoy
substantially all of the advantages of ownership and <lt the
same time place it beyond the legitimate claims of his
creditors.

Ibid. at 1243; and authorities therein cited.
Ted Gubler is in the physical possession of

of the property he transferred to the trust.

mu~h

When a

transferor retains possession of the property transferred.
it is conclusive evidence of fraud.

See Johnson et. al v.

Emery, 31 Utah 126, 86 P. 869 ( 1906); Charleston Co-op v.
W. Allen & Bros., 40 Utah 575, 123 P.

Ann. §25-1-14 (1953, as amended).

578 (1912); Utah Code

Another Utah case helC

that all transfers must be accompanh:d with fair
consideration, if not and the person is thus insolvent it;,
fraudulent, regardless of intent.
198, 48 P.2d 513 (1935).

Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah

It has also been held that

conveyances between close relatives are subject to rigid
scrutiny, but are not ipso facto fraudulent.

In detero11Di 1c>

whether a conveyance is fraudulent as to creditors, rhz·1
fact r,1ust be determined from the facts of each case cJncl fee·
the circumstances surrounding the transaction.

Ned J_

Bowmand Company v. White, 12 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.;'cl %'
(1962).
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l

In cases from surr:~nding states, the courts have

1,,.,

11

\11

Arizona Bc;rck v. Morris, 6 ..\riz. App. 566, 435 P.2d 73

basic agreement with :he principles discussed above.

ill

the court stated tha: under the cormnon law which has

1\967),
b~cn

adopted by statute in Arizona, any trust settled for

rhe benefit of the settler io unenforceable as against the

creditors of the settlor, no:-.-1ithstanding the lack of
fraudulent intent on the par: of the settler.

The Oregon

Supreme Court stated that on:=s property should be subject to
payment of his debts,

he has vested a nominal title

althou~i

thecero in some other persoL.

If a trust is for the settler

for his life with a power in :he settler to appoint the
remainder interest to others. he may be held to be the
dbsolutc owner of the trust :roperty and his creditors may
reach it.

Johnson v. Commec::.al Bank, 284 Or. 675, 588 P.2d

109ii (1978).

In the Kansas c=.se of Herd v. Chambers, 158

K2n. 614, 149 P.2d 583 (194L , the court stated that one
cannot create out of his owE ?roperty for his own benefit a
trust and thereby defeat the lawful demands of his
r1Pd1Lors, even though no

fre~d

is intended.

Ted Gubler has exer:ed tremendous control over the
'.L11ct,

to the extent that it c.ppears that the property is

drlually his own and that he =an do whatever he pleases with
i1

When asked what Ted Gub:er's duties as manager were,

l.d!'rele Orton said, "\Jell, gee,
Y< 1 t1

loo!~

I guess what a manager does;

after your~roc:ertv or the share of whatever
33

he's managing on the business end of it."
LaPrele G. Orton Deposition at Page 12,

198, Linc 18.

Glen

Gubl,~r

(cn:ph, 1 ·:i~

,;cc

stated thac he

"b" n,

W<i~

LdLlell

mainly to sign documents ratifying the decisillns of 'led
Gubler and that it was Ted Gubler who made all the
day-to-day management-type decisions with regacd to trust
property.

Glen Gubler Deposition at Pages 21-72.

When

Cox was asked whether it was common for Ted Cubler to sigu
documents as manager for the trust, she replied, "\.Jell, I
guess where we've discussed them, and maybe he felt this'·"
-- where he had already discussed these things 1.;ith us, tk
was all right.
at Page 12.

I wasn't aware of it."

J can Cox Dcpositior

Ted Gubler also authorized his sun Stephen

Gubler tu endorse the check, marked and received as E·:l;il11:
3 during the trial, as an agent of the Leslie \Jilco:; FJni.
Trust.

Ted Gubler Deposition at Pages 19-20.

Page 252.

Sef

also~:.

Yet the trustees didn't even know thJt Stepher

Gubler could act as such an agent.

LaPrele Orton was osk1•

if Stephen Gubler was an agent of the trust and she
answered, "I don't know."

13.

LaPre le Orton Deposit ion at P"t'

Jean Cox stated that she found out after the L1ct tha:

Stephen Gubler had endorsed the check as all agent of the
trust.

Jean Cox Deposition at Pages 13-14.

Pages 162, 163, and 197.

See alcc 1

':

LaPrele Orton did not kncJ\'7

the $114,158.34 went which was due Lo the tru:ot from the
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1

s:ile oi the property to E\·erett Johnston, what property was
in the trust, or whether

an:,,

financial records were kept.

LaPrele Orton Deposition at Pages 15, 18 and 19.
'1 'l' !

1

ctgC:

See also

19 /.

Ted Gubler's stateLents also indicate his control
over the trust and trust property.

He indicated that he

voted to bring new trustees into the trust.

Ted Gubler

Deposition at Page 4, and on Page 6 he still refers to the
trust property as "my home" and "all the property I've
always had."

At Page 8, Mr. Gubler, in discussing the

possihle purchase of the Graf: Farm, stated, "So we met with
our trustees and told them •,.;hat we would like them to do."
Again, the

state~ents

from the Defendants'

depositions coincide with the facts presented during the
trial of the above-entitled case.
The Trust Agreement itself

al~o

shows that the

creation of the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust was a fraudulent
conveyance by the trustor.
paragraph 25 of said

~rial

agree~ent,

Exhibit No. 21.

In

the settlors of the trust

exchanged all of their property for 100 certificates of
beneficial interest in the trust.

This is exactly the

iT<rnsaction that the above cases and argument have
continually declared void.

It would be irrelevant what the

•ettlors subsequently did with the certificate of beneficial
interest, at the time of the creation of the trust the
settlors had placed all their property in trust and had

retained the beneficial interest in themselves.
Leach v. Anderson case,

supr~,

the court held th"r ivhtthe·

trust should be regard.cc!. as ut1e cteatcc!. for ci1e u .. ~ """
benefit of the trustor and thus void as against

exisrin~

,

subsequent credit:ors of the trustor is to be deterrnin 2 r1
what the trustor had a right t:o take under its terms duric
his or her lifetime, rather than upon what he or she h2 s
actually used therefrom.

Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the rrust

agreement provide that the holders of the beneficial
certificat:es will be entitled to distribution of trust
corpus for purposes of education, health, emergency st:p;
and maintenance, or to maintain their accustomed st2nd'1rJ
living.

Paragraph 17 provides for the annual clistrihurir'

of all ordinary income to the holders of beneficial
certificates.

The settlors may be trustees or employees c:

the trust and would be entitled to be paid a salary
be insured.

See Paragraphs 15, 19 and 29.

dud t·

These pr1l'_,i,ir

all provide for some retention of the benefiLs in the
settlors.
The facts and circumstances of this case sho .1 '
the settlor of the Leslie \/ilco;.,, Family Trust allcmplt•i
put all his property behind the shield of a trust
instrument, while at the same t:ime retaining all the
benefits and enjoyment that that property had r,iven hii
before the conveyance.

The r:icrits and intent of such"
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rr1nsfer are not argued here, but it is argued that any such
rr;,tiofer operates as a fraudulent conveyance as against the
cr""sicror's existing and future creditors.

POINT II I: THE CONDITION "SUBJECT TO TRUSTEES'
WRITTEN OKAY" IS INVALID As A CONDITION
PRECEDENT
The effect of correct factual findings and the
application of the doctrines in Point II, above, is to void
the "conditions" in the documents.
A.

The "condition" is illusory.

This supposed condition precedent i.e. "Subject to
Trustees' \frit;::en Okay", found in Trial Exhibit No. 2, is
merely illusory and an attempt by Ted Gubler to shield
himself from the consequences of his written contract.

Ted

Gubler acted as manager of the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust
dnd in that capacity he made the daily management type
Jecisions for the trust.

He was also, along with his son

Stephen, instrumental in the negotiations for the purchase

dud sale of the Graff Farm.

He and his son gave their

advice to the trustees of the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust and
tbe trustees seemed to always follow such advice.

Glen

C:ubler stated th.at he had never denied Ted Gubler permission
t ''

.}

buy or sell property.

Deposition of Glen Gubler, Page

Jean Cox stated that she didn't know if she had ever

Jenied such permission before.

Deposition of Jean Cox, Page
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18.

Ted Gubler stated that he did not knmv uf c"1c:

Ui't

where the trustees had ever denied one of his u'q11 1 01 :,

252.
B.

The "condition" was exercisable only in Lac
aith.

Ted Gubler signed an agree!I'ent with Tom Addms
promising that the Leslie Wilcox Far.iily Trust would con

15% interest in the Graff Farm to the Adams.

·e:

Yet Mr. Gd'.,

then advises the trustees not to sell to tlr. i\dnms but tc.
Everett Johnston, which sale was consurrunated in March of

1980.

TT, Pages 245-247.

Such double dea 1 ing and bdd f,'

on the part of Ted Gubler c1nnot be looLed upon li;_;hrly
this Court.
C.

Equity shoulc': dispense with the conclitio".

The noted scholar on contract law, i\rthur L.
Corbin, states in his volume, Corbin on ConLracts, thac <
"court must determine when justice requires dispc:nsing 1•i:
a condition as wel 1 as when to find one, either express "
constructive."

Corbin, Corbin on Cc.:ntracts, 1 Vol Eci.,

Publishing Co.,

(1975) section 649.

It is manifest in the

case that justice can be served only by the court decl:«i·
the purported condition in this contrnct to be uf

l'U

"''''

In furtherance of this point Corbin scirc:, rli·
"one who unjustly prevents the performance or thl' h;iµpc ''
of a condition of his own promissory duty thereby eli1uC1''

_J
i
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il JS such a condition.

He will not be pennitted to take

;id'.·a11tage of his own wrong, and to escape from liability for
, ,,,

rc ;,dc:i.·ing his proDised performance Ly preventing the
0

haf>pening of the condition on which it was promised."
Section 767.
~chlott~an,

Ibid

See also, Dupont DeNemours Powder G. v.
218 F. 363 (2nd Cir., 1914); Camden v. Jarrett,

154 F. 788 (4th Cir., 1907).

The Leslie Wilcox Family Trust

would not be wrong for refusing to perform the contract,
except for the fact that the nonperformance of the condition
was unjustly caused by Ted Gubler, its manager.

Mr.

Gublcr's actions prevented the performance of the condition,
thus the subsequent refusal to perform the contract is a
hreach of the same.

"Prevention eliminates the condition,

for purposes of remedy."
D.

Ibid.

Good Faith Obligation

In the Utah case of Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d
34~

(Utah 1980) the court stated that when parties entered

into contracts, such as for the purchase of real property,
. it is to be assumed t~at they will cooperate with
each other in good faith for its performance

347.
1910).

Ibid at

See also, Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah
In this last cited case the court also states the

''pruposition that the parties to a contract are obliged to
proceed in good faith to cooperate in perforuing the
contract in accordance with its expressed intent

. [O]ne

rarty to a contract cannot by willful act or omission make
39

it impossible

O"."

difficult for the other tu pcrfon, 1 ,,r .'

make the other's non-performance as a def c'nse."
859.

See also ?ischer v. Johnson, 525 l'.;'J

4)

~ ..

(i«d,

"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of 6 ooc
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcemem"
Restatement, 2nd, Contracts Tentative Draft (1976), §21'.
In the comments to §231 it is stated that "Good faith
performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes
faithfulness to an agreed comraon purpose and consistency
with the justified expectations of the other party;

*

Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good
faith in performance even though the actor believes his
conduct to be justified.
E.

The condition is excused.

A party to a contract may not be bound to
necessarily take positive action to bring about the
performance of a condition, but it has been held that
"active conduct of a conditional promisor preventing or
hindering the :ulfillment of the condition elir:linates it
makes the proc:'..se absolute."
§§361 and 427.
174 N.E.

1,)6,

17 Am.Jur.

2nd, Crmtracr'

See also, Amies v. \Jesnofske, 2S'l N.Y. fr
73 ALR 918 (1931).

The Restau11u1c,

Contracts, §295 and Corbin, §769 state that the pt!rti>,
of a condition may be excused by the promisor'b hinJ,
was well as by his prevention of said condition.

Ith"'

been shown tha;: the trustees of the Leslie \hlcox Faciilv
40

I

, rust

1-.1

n.: merely the

'rubber stamps' of the decisions made

1,_,, 'lr·rl and Stephen Gubler, and that these men did in fact

ruu Lhc affairs in regards to all of the trust property.

In

Weber Meadow-View Corporation v. Wilde, 575 P.2d 1053 (Utah
1g78),

the court stated that a party who enters into a

contract must cooperate in good faith to carry out the
intentions of the parties and that one party cannot engaged
in any subterfuge or devious means to prevent the other
party from performing, and then using that as his excuse for
failing to keep his own commitments.
F.

Examples of court eliminated conditions.

In some more refined areas of the law, it has been
held that contractual conditions will be eliminated due to
one party's bad faith.

In contracts conditional on the

grcinting of "permits", if one party causes the granting
authority to refuse the "permit", an action for damages for
Lrcach of contract is maintainable.

Corbin, supra, §83.

There are also contracts which are conditioned upon an
expert giving a certificate as to the completeness of
certain contracts.
giv~

In this type of contract courts will not

effect to such express conditions if the expert's

tc•fusal is not "in good faith."

Thus the contract is

·11forccable without the condition.
t ktL

i~
lhie

;:i

It is unanimously agreed

condition \vill be eliminated if its non-performance

the result of the fraudulent collusion of the expert and
contracting party.

Conscious and neglectful ignorance

41

of the facts may not be as bad as an intentional
misrepresentation of facts known to exist,

b11L

is

eliminate the condition.
an expert's opinion, fraud and bad faith exist if the C·,p,·
fails and refuses t:o exal'.line the performance.

~

\6).

This same rule is also stated in Restat:ernent, Contracts
§303, which is quoted in Corbin on Contracts.
The conditional contract signed by Ted Gubler
presently valid and enforceable, t:he condition being
eliminated due to 'led Gubler' s bad faith and double de"1
with Toru Adams.
G.

Conditions in corpora re documents.

lt is stated here,

that the condition 1v-rittc11

the stock subscript ion agreements signed by '.; tcphen

G 1~ble:

and Tom Adams is also excused, the above argument being
exactly applicable to these contracts.

Stephen Gubler

exhibited his bad faith when he voted as a director of
Steamboat Vista, Ir,c., not to sell stock to the Ad;ims
pursuant to the subscription contracts he had earlier
as an incorpor a tor of that corp oration.

0

It is evident

1~ 1
U'·

all the parties \'/ere initially trying to arrang,e a meclki.
by which the Graff Farm could be purchased by poolint, th·
assets of several parties.

The bad faith and inside ''

of Ted and Stephen Gubler become even more i1pparc11L .1
tried to squeeze the Adams out of the transaction

42

enL i i , '

;,) 1 the: parcics had been very agreeable on allowing the

I Jaint:iffs a 15% interest in the farm when ready cash was
'''· c

.en'.

tic.

c>iHl

Aci:lFlS

b<.1d s·:ich cash readily available.

Yet,

uhen another purchaser was found who had even more available
ta~h

co l<.1y down, the Gublers began to systematically eject

the Appellants from the deal entirely.

Ted Gubler used his

influence to keep the trustees from giving their written
consent to the contract he signed, and also voted as a
director of Sceamboat Vista, Inc., not to sell stock to the
Adi!!l:s.

The result being, tha c through the Gublers' actions,

the Adams were left with nothing after all their
net;oriations and after having put up almost $38,000.00.

The

Cublers retained the Plaintiffs' 15% of the Farrn for
themselves.

This Court:, in justice, cannot sanction or

defend this result.

CONCLUSION
Appellants have shmm that the trial court made
drasti~

and substantial errors in its Findings of Fact.

The

evidence is undisputed that the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust
dnd Ted Gubler were one and the same insofar as ownership of
ell" property of the trust was concerned.
1 l1dt

t

tllst.

They further show

the representations made by Ted Gubler in behalf of the
were as if they were f'lade in his behalf solely and

tliar Tom Adams was justified in his reliance upon Ted

Culiler 's \ffitteri documents.

Torn Adams was involved with the
43

purchase of the subject property from the early

he~i,1'ti

of any negotiations for the purchase of that pruµeny.
\·Jhether that purchase was to be consunu;tat<eu

throu,~h

tiir-

trust agreement, the corporate entity or as an outright
purchase, the contemplation of all parties concerned was
that they would all provide capital for that venture and
would all share an undivided ownership interest in the
property.

ieci

The corporate entity that was established was

merely one vehicle by which they had proposed to accomplisr
that end objective.

Mr. Adams' investment into the stock

purchase agreement was the same as if he had made the
investment into the property itself.

The Gublers' later

refusals to honor the stock purchase agreement or the
agreement of the trust was brought about in bad faith and
should not defeat the Adams right to share in the benefitt
of property ownership.
This Court should reverse the lower court's
decision and direct that judgment be entered in behalf,,[
Henry Thomas Adams and Henry Thomas Adams III requiring

ti·

Defendani::s to convey a 15% interest in the subject proptr'
to the Appellants, and for partition of the property.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this
November, 1983.
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